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INTERJURISDICTIONAL PRECLUSION AND
FEDERAL COMMON LAW: TOWARD A
GENERAL APPROACHt
Stephen B. Burbanktt
In this paper, I will present some tentative conclusions from
work-in-progress. My thesis is that problems of interjurisdictional
preclusion always, and that even preclusion problems domestic to
state courts in one state may, present problems in the relationship
between federal and state law. I believe further that progress can be
made in solving the mysteries of interjurisdictional preclusion by
recognizing that, apart from the Constitution, unless a federal statute provides or chooses preclusion law, the only putative federal
preclusion law available is federal common law. Finally, contrary to
conventional formulations, I believe that the full faith and credit
statute' does not provide or choose preclusion law. The perspective
of federal common law is therefore appropriate in considering the
law that governs the preclusive effects of a state court judgment in
the courts of the same state, which, by reason of the statute, is also
the law that governs its interjurisdictional effects.
At the start, I acknowledge a substantial intellectual debt to
Professor Ronan Degnan, whose 1976 article, Federalized Res Judicata, 2 dispersed fog that, in this area as in others involving the relationship between federal and state law, rolled in after the Supreme
Court's decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.3 Perhaps his most important contribution was the reminder that the full faith and credit
statute speaks to the preclusive effects of state court judgments in
© 1985 Stephen B. Burbank
Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Pennsylvania. This
paper was delivered to the Section on Civil Procedure at the annual meeting of the
American Association of Law Schools on January 5, 1985. It summarizes the tentative
conclusions of the author on the problems treated. A more comprehensive article is in
preparation. Although that will be the occasion to thank the many people who have
assisted me in this work, I want to acknowledge my gratitude to Frank Goodman and
Linda Silberman, my colleagues and friends, for their especially valuable assistance in
this preliminary phase.
1 The full faith and credit statute provides that "[s]uch Acts, records and judicial
proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1982).
2 Degnan, Federalized ResJudicata, 85 YALE LJ. 741 (1976).
3
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
t
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federal courts, and the demonstration that, as a result, in a federal
diversity suit involving a prior state judgment, Erie jurisprudence
must yield to the statutory command. 4 Professor Degnan's reminder also made it clear that the full faith and credit statute must
be reckoned with not only in subsequent diversity cases, but whenever
a state court judgment is claimed to have preclusive effect in federal
court. Although he did not pursue those issues, they have been the
focal point of recent decisions by the Supreme Court in federal
cases involving assertions of federal substantive rights.
Professor Degnan did not neglect the problem of federal judgments, which neither the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution 5 nor the full faith and credit statute appears to include. He
painted two historical pictures. The first depicts the Court deriving
the obligation to respect federal judgments from the full faith and
credit statute. 6 In the second, depicting the law that measures the
basic obligation, the Conformity Act 7 dominates the background,
leading the Supreme Court to tie the preclusive effects of all federal
judgments to those prescribed by the courts of the state in which
they sit.8 In the foreground, with 1938 a clear divide, stand the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie. Degnan noted the gradual
acceptance, after some Erie-inspired doubts, of the proposition that
uniform federal law governs the preclusive effects of federal judgments adjudicating matters of federal substantive law.9 Building on
the rejection of conformity in the Federal Rules, the impact of enhanced procedural opportunities on modem preclusion law, and on
a few pre-1976 cases holding that federal preclusion law controls
the effects of federal judgments adjudicating matters of state substantive law, 10 he proposed the following as a general rule:
A validjudgment rendered in any judicial system within the United States
must be recognized by all otherjudicialsystems within the United States, and
the claims and issues precluded by that judgment, and the parties bound
thereby, are determined by the law of the system which rendered the
judgment.11
4 See Degnan, supra note 2, at 750-55. The Rules of Decision Act provides that
state law applies "except where ... Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide." 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1982). The full faith and credit statute requires federal courts to give the
same effect to a state court judgment that courts in the rendering state would give it.
5 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof." U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 1.
6 See Degnan, supra note 2, at 744-50.
7 Act ofJune 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5 & 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
8 See Degnan, supra note 2, at 755-57.
9 See id. at 759-60.
10 See id. at 760-71.
11 Id. at 773 (emphasis in original).
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Professor Degnan's proposed general rule has the appeal of
symmetry, but it also has the substantial advantages of simplicity
and predictability, which are important where legal rules shape litigation conduct, as do preclusion rules. In my view, however, those
advantages are purchased at a cost too great. Applied to federal
judgments adjudicating matters of state substantive law, as it has
been by some lower federal courts,1 2 the rule risks the sacrifice of
state substantive policies and of the federal policy against different
outcomes on the basis of citizenship. Applied to state judgments
adjudicating matters of federal substantive law, as it has been by the
Supreme Court in recent cases, 13 the rule risks the sacrifice of federal substantive policies.
With respect to federal judgments, my research suggests that
we need some new historical pictures. Considering first the obligation to respect federal judgments, it is not just that the words of the
full faith and credit statute hardly can bear the interpretation that all
federal court judgments are covered.1 4 It is also that the statute has
always provided the measure of the obligation to respect the judgments it covers: interjurisdictional preclusive effects are measured
by domestic preclusive effects. 15 Federal courts in territories, countries subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and the District
12
See, e.g., Silcox v. United Trucking Serv., 687 F.2d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 1982);
Miller v. A.H. Robins Co., 565 F. Supp. 24, 25 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
13
See infra text accompanying notes 73-80. The word "adjudicating" in this context includes the preclusion of federal claims and issues not raised as such in the initial
action.
14
As enacted in 1790, the statute provided that the duly authenticated "records
and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state . . . shall have such faith and credit
given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the
courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken." Act of May 26,
1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. The obligation thus imposed was extended to the records and
judicial proceedings of the courts "of the respective territories of the United States, and
countries subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" by the Act of Mar. 27, 1804,
ch. 55, 2 Stat. 298, 299. "It would be little more than an act of blind heroism to contend
that federal courts are included as the courts of a country 'subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States.' The rendition of this phrase as referring to a 'possession' of the
United States in the present codification of the Judicial Code seems to reflect a much
more probable interpretation." 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4468, at 651 n.10 (1981) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER].

15 With respect to the interjurisdictional effects of the proceedings of state courts in
other states, the statute implements the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.
See supra note 5. The full faith and credit statute's extension of the obligation to federal
courts has been thought to represent a "nearly contemporaneous" construction of the
constitutional provision by the first Congress. Degnan, supra note 2, at 744.
Congress's power to prescribe the effects of federal judicial proceedings does not
derive from article IV, § 1. E.g., Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130, 134
(1875); Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1883); see also infra text accompanying notes
20-22.

628

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70:625

of Columbia 16 can be assimilated to state courts for purposes of the
measure of interjurisdictional effects the statute provides. But for
other, geographically dispersed, federal courts there is no obvious
domestic referent or model. The problem of domesticating federal
judgments for purposes of the full faith and credit statute might appear to have inspired the rule stated in early cases that the preclusive effects of a federal court judgment are determined by the
preclusion law applied in the courts of the state in which the rendering federal court sits. But the first case to state the rule did not
mention the statute, 17 and the first case to suggest the relevance of
the statute did not involve a federal court that sat in a state.18 Moreover, long before 1938 the Supreme Court held that, at least in
some cases, federal preclusion law governs the effects of federal
judgments adjudicating matters of federal substantive law. 19
In fact, the first decision of the Supreme Court dealing with the
problem of respect for federal judgments suggested that the obligation to respect the federal judgment involved in that case derived
from the federal statutes that created the court and vested it with
16 See Embry, 107 U.S. at 10 ("The question then arises, what causes would have
been sufficient in the District of Columbia, according to the law then in force, to have
authorized its courts to set aside the judgment ....
"); infra text accompanying note 18.
It is not necessary to read Embry as interpreting the statute to cover the judicial proceedings of all federal courts. But see Degnan, supra note 2, at 746-47. Early commentators
suggested that the District of Columbia, whose court's judgment was involved in Embry,
was a " 'country subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.' " Note, Conclusiveness
and Effect ofJudgments as between Federal and State Courts, 21 U.S.C.C.A. Rep. 478 (1897).
See also Note, ResJudicataas a FederalQuestion, 25 HARV. L. REv. 443, 445 (1912). In any
event, the Court had already posited an obligation to respect federal judgments and
prescribed the effects of a federal judgment without relying on the statute. See Dupassenr,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 134-35; infra text accompanying note 20. Moreover, in Embry itself
the Court relied on a prior decision in which it had recognized, albeit without reference
to the supplemental act of 1804, that "the act of Congress does not apply to the courts
of the United States ....
" Turnbull v. Payson, 95 U.S. 418, 423 (1877), cited in Embry,
107 U.S. at 10. In some cases, however, the Court did rely on the full faith and credit
statute in according preclusive effect to the judgments of federal courts. See, e.g., Metcalf
v. Watertown, 153 U.S. 671, 675-76 (1894).
17 See Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130 (1875).
18 Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1883).
19 See, e.g., Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499 (1903), in which the Court
noted:
But it is equally well settled that a right claimed under the Federal
Constitution, finally adjudicated in the Federal courts, can never be taken
away or impaired by state decisions. The same reasoning which permits
to the States the right of final adjudication upon purely state questions
requires no less respect for the final decisions of the Federal courts of
questions of national authority and jurisdiction.
Id. at 517. See also Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 290-91 (1906); 18
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4468, at 656-57. But Deposit Bank hardly
"made explicit" the rule "that federal rules measure at least most res judicata questions" as Wright, Miller, and Cooper argue. Id. at 656.
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jurisdiction. 20 The notion that implicit in, and necessary to fructify,
a congressional grant of jurisdiction to a federal court is an obligation on the state courts not by their own lights to disregard ajudgment entered by that court should win easy acceptance from those
accustomed to federal common lawmaking. Perhaps in the nineteenth century the decision involved a more extreme form of "judicial legislation" 2 ' than the wrenching out of shape of the full faith
and credit statute, but again, federal common law is not a recent
phenomenon. In any event, under the decision that advanced the
suggestion, state law was held to furnish the measure of respect due
the federal judgment, and like the basic obligation itself, the state
preclusion rules were binding throughout the nation under the
supremacy clause. 22 Here, in other words, is a theory of respect for
20

Where a State court refuses to give effect to the judgment of a court
of the United States rendered upon the point in dispute, and with jurisdiction of the case and the parties, a question is undoubtedly raised
which, under the Act of 1867, may be brought to this court for revision.
The case would be one in which a title or right is claimed under an authority exercised
under the United States, and the decision is against the title or right so set up. It
would thus be a case arisingunder the laws of the United States, establishing the
Circuit Court and vesting it with jurisdiction;and hence it would be within the
judicial power of the United States, as defined by the Constitution; and it
is clearly within the chart of appellate power given to this court, over
cases arising in and decided by the State courts.
The refusal by the courts of one State to give effect to the decisionsof the courts of
another State is an infringement of a different article of the Constitution, to wit, the
first section of articlefour; and the right to bring such a case before us by writ
of error under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, or the Act of
1867, is based on the refusal of a State court to give validity and effect to
the right claimed under that article and section.
In either case, therefore, whether the validity or due effect of ajudgment of the State court, or that of ajudgment of a United States court, is
disallowed by a State court, the Constitution and laws furnish redress by a
final appeal to this court.
Dupasseur v. Rocherau, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130, 134 (1875) (emphasis added). See 18
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4468, at 654.
21 Costigan, The History of the Adoption of Section 1 of Article IV of the United States Consti-

tution and a Considerationof the Effect on Judgments of that Section and of Federal Legislation, 4
COLUM. L. REV. 470, 484 (1904).
22

The only effect that can be justly claimed for the judgment in the
Circuit Court of the United States, is such as would belong to judgments
of the State courts rendered under similar circumstances. Dupasseur& Co.
were citizens of France,and brought the suit in the Circuit Court of the United States
as such citizens; and, consequently, that court, deriving itsjurisdictionsolelyfrom the
citizenship of the parties, was in the exercise ofjurisdiction to administerthe laws of
the State, and its proceedings were had in accordancewith the forms and course of
proceeding in the State courts. It is apparent, therefore, that no higher sanctity or effect can be claimed for thejudgment. . . rendered in such a case
under such circumstances than is due to the judgments of the State courts
in a like case and under similar circumstances. If by the laws of the State
a judgment like that rendered by the Circuit Court would have had a
binding effect as against Rochereau, if it had been rendered in a State
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federal judgments that has the promise of coherence. The problem
in each case is to determine the law that governs the preclusive effects of a federal judgment. Once determined, that law, whether
federal or state, is binding under the supremacy clause because, or
to the extent that, it defines the measure of the basic obligation to
respect the judgment.
A new historical picture is also needed for the law governing
the preclusive effects of federal judgments. I have already noted
that 1938 marked no great divide with respect to judgments on federal questions, 2 3 and that there was thus no monolithic rule requiring the use of state law prior to that time. Moreover, the impetus to
apply state law to federal diversity judgments lay less in the Conformity Act than in the duty of a federal court exercising diversity
jurisdiction to "administer the laws of the State," by which the
Court meant state substantive law. 24 Thus, whether the Court applied state preclusion law or federal preclusion law to federal judgments, the emphasis 'was on the source of the substantive law
administered by the rendering court. That may come as a surprise
to those who have been taught to think of preclusion as procedure
and to think of procedure as disembodied from substantive rights.
In the nineteenth century and beyond, the central function of preclusion law was thought to be the protection of the substantive
25
rights embodied in a judgment.
So much for history. I will not belabor my analysis of the law
that governs the preclusive effects of the judgments of federal courts
court, then it should have the same effect, being rendered by the Circuit
Court. If such effect is not conceded to it, but is refused, then due validity andeffect
are not given to it, and a case is madefor the interposition of the power of reversal
conferred upon this court.
Dupasseur, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 135 (emphasis added).
23
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
24 Dupasseur,88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 135; see also supra note 22; 18 WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 14, § 4468. The headnotes to Dupasseur were written by Justice
Bradley, author of the Court's opinion. Headnote 3 provides in relevant part: "Ifjurisdiction of the case was acquired only by reason of the citizenship of the parties, and the
state law alone was administered, then only such validity and effect can be claimed for
the judgment as would be due to the judgment of the State Courts under like circumstances." Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 22 L. Ed. 588 (1875). See also Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 129-30 (1912).
25

This doctrine of resjudicatais not a mere matter of practice or procedure inherited from a more technical time than ours. It is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, "of public policy and of private peace,"
which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the courts to the end
that rights once established by the finaljudgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction shall be recognized by those who are bound by it in every
way, wherever the judgment is entitled to respect.
Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917). See also Deposit Bank v.
Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 520 (1903).
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adjudicating matters of federal substantive law. That uniform federal law applies has been generally assumed, and indeed the proposition has been stated, without analysis, by the Supreme Court on a
number of occasions. 2 6 The conclusion may seem obvious, and certainly there is federal lawmaking competence. If, however, one analyzes the problem as a problem of federal common law, the
conclusion is not self-evident, precisely because it imports uniform
federal rules rather than state law borrowed as federal law except
where it is hostile to or inconsistent with federal policies.2 7 For
those who are skeptical of any role for state law, even borrowed as
federal law, a consideration of limitations periods under federal statutes not containing any may provide food for thought.2 8 Further,
the justifications for uniform federal preclusion rules are harder to
come by for one who believes, as I do, that the Rules of Decision
Act 2 9 has received rough treatment in the Supreme Court's federal
common law decisions. 3 0 I believe that the conclusion is correct, in
part because a regime of borrowed state law would present serious
3
problems of administrability for both courts and litigants. '
Federal judgments adjudicating matters of state substantive law
are, however, another matter. Here, the Rules of Decision Act must
be confronted unless one accepts Professor Degnan's argument
that, because the power conferred by article III on the federal courts
26 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
324 n.12 (1971); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1938). Seealso Heiserv. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946); supra note 19 and accompanying text.
27 For a representative example of the Supreme Court's approach to federal common law after Erie, see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). For
more recent treatment, see United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
See generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie - and of the New FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383 (1964); Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw" Competence and Discretionin the
Choice of National and State Rules For Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957); Note, The
Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1969). Because they are "[legal rules
which impact significantly upon the effectuation of federal rights, [preclusion rules] must
...be treated as raising federal questions" in this context. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S.
471, 477 (1979).
28 See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966). Professor Scott
noted that limitations periods and preclusion rules have a common purpose of "putting
an end to controversies." Scott, CollateralEstoppel byJudgment, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1942).
29
"The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
30
See, e.g., DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 228788 n.13 (1983); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 590-94
(1973); see also infra notes 36 & 59 and accompanying text.
31
The problems for the federal courts would include supervising a system of borrowed, trans-substantive state preclusion law to ensure against the application of particular rules that are hostile to or inconsistent with federal policies. The problems for
litigants would include ascertaining the state law to be borrowed: a miscalculation could
lead to the loss of federal rights.
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finally to determine the preclusive effects of their judgments is implicated at some point, it is best to ignore the Act. 32 I do not accept
that argument,3 3 nor the argument that federal common law is one
of the sources of federal law that, if it otherwise requires or provides, displaces state law under the Act. 34 Finally, I do not accept
the argument that the Rules of Decision Act plays a role but the role
it plays is up to the reader, who is free to manipulate the language
"in the cases where they apply," as he or she chooses. 35 In my view,
the Rules of Decision Act speaks directly to the circumstances when
it is permissible for federal courts to fashion or apply federal com36
mon law.
The two most influential works discussing interjurisdictional
preclusion since Professor Degnan's article have been the Restatement (Second) of Judgments,37 and volume 18 of Wright, Miller and
Cooper's treatise on federal practice and procedure.3 8 Neither work
fully embraces Professor Degnan's general rule as applied to federal
judgments adjudicating matters of state substantive law. Both endorse the view that federal law controls but suggest that state preclusion law should be borrowed when it reflects state substantive

See Degnan, supra note 2, at 768-70.
The Court has acknowledged plenary power in Congress to prescribe the practice and procedure of the federal courts, see, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-74
(1965); Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941), as well as the rules of evidence
applied therein, see Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1980); Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 31 (1976). Accordingly, the Court is unlikely to hold
that the power to formulate rules having greater substantive implications, such as rules
of preclusion, is "necessary to the exercise of all others," United States v. Hudson, 1 I
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812), with the result that in formulating them the courts would
be "shielded from direct democratic controls." Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447
U.S. 752, 764 (1980). For a discussion of the inherent power of federal courts, see Burbank, Sanctions in the ProposedAmendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997, 1004-06 (1983); see also Burbank, The Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1115 n.455 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act].
34
See Westen, After "Life for Erie"--A Reply, 78 MICn. L. REv. 971, 985-88 (1980);
Westen & Lehman, Is There Lifefor Erie after the Death of Diversity?, 78 MiCH. L. REv. 311,
369-71 (1980). On this point, I agree with Professor Redish. See Redish, Continuing the
Erie Debate: A Response to Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REv. 959, 962-64, 968 n.60
(1980).
35 See Redish, supra note 34, at 968-69 n.60.
36 For the text of the act, see supra note 29. Under this view, federal common law
applies where "the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress"
expressly so "provide" or where, fairly read, they implicitly and plausibly call for ("require") it. The act should not, however, be interpreted "in a crabbed or wooden fashion." Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 598 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,dissenting). See
also infra note 59 and accompanying text.
37
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS (1982).
32
33

38

18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14.
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policies. 39 I believe they both have it backwards.
Uniform federal rules may be required when dealing with some
aspects of preclusion law, regardless of the substantive law applied
by the rendering federal court or the ground of its jurisdiction. But
these matters involve preconditions to status as a judgment entitled
to recognition, such as validity and finality, or their functional
equivalent, the "on the merits" exception to bar, where federal stan40
dards may be necessary to protect the basic obligation of respect.
Indeed, in circuits that have not clearly committed themselves to
Professor Degnan's general rule but that have applied federal preclusion law to some matters, the matters have clustered around
these problems. 41 We may forgive reliance on rule 41(b) 4 2 as the
source of the federal preclusion rule, 43 but we should not extrapolate from the cases a principle broader than that which was necessary to decide them.
If that were all, neither a traditional federal common law analysis nor a Rules of Decision Act approach would lead one to conclude
that uniform federal rules are required for all questions of preclu39

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 87 comment b, at 316-18 (1982); 18

& COOPER, supra note 14, § 4472, at 732-40.
40 For treatments of validity and finality from a domestic perspective, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 1-16 (1982). The Second Restatement has discarded the
"on the merits" label but retains exceptions to bar. Id. § 20.
The obligation to respect federal judgments would be meaningless if state courts
were free to define for themselves those judgments that would be respected. That
premise does not, of course, automatically mean that uniform federal rules apply. But,
particularly because such rules govern where the federal judgment adjudicates a federal
question, see supra text accompanying notes 26-31, and given the undisputed federal interest in protecting the basic obligation of respect, uniform federal rules do seem appropriate and may be thought to be required. For a case suggesting that federal preclusion
law governs an issue of validity of a diversity judgment, see Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
In the case of so-called disciplinary dismissals under FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (b), the basic
federal interest is buoyed by the additional consideration that uncertainty as to the binding nature of federal judicial action might lead to disregard of valid Federal Rules and
orders and that the costs of such disregard would fall on the federal courts.
41 See, e.g., PRC Harris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 897 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 344 (1983) (federal law governs effect of dismissal of diversity action under
FED. R. CIv. P. 41(b)); Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee v. L'Union Atlantique S.A.
D'Assurances, 723 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1983) (same); Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 707
F.2d 1493, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (federal law governs finality of diversity judgment).
For a subsequent case qualifying broad language in Hunt, see Answering Serv. v. Egan,
728 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
43 See Degnan, supra note 2, at 760-63. Cf. Cemer v. Marathon Oil Co., 583 F.2d
830, 832 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (rule 41(b) dismissal in federal action asserting
federal substantive rights). For the role that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can properly play in connection with preclusion law, see infra text accompanying notes 45-53.
The conclusion that federal law controls on these matters does not extend to the
law governing the claims or issues that may be precluded by the judgment or the parties
who may benefit from or are bound by the judgment.
WRIGHT, MILLER
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sion. The matters considered thus far are a discrete group recognizable as such by courts and litigants. As to the rest of preclusion law,
federal substantive interests are contingent, implicated only if the
application of preclusion rules in subsequent litigation would foreclose federal claims or issues not originally asserted, while state substantive interests are directly implicated. Given a clearly articulated
choice of law rule for diversity cases, problems of administrability of
44
a system of borrowed state law would not be serious for litigants.
Moreover, federal procedural interests, to the extent they are even
cognizable, are not merely contingent. From the point of view of
the administrability concerns of the federal courts, they are nonexistent. The costs of subsequent litigation would be incurred by the
federal courts only if that litigation were brought or removed there.
In such a situation, the federal court would be well positioned to
check the application of state law that was hostile to or inconsistent
with federal policies. Finally, diversity cases require attention to the
independent federal policy against different outcomes on the basis
of citizenship.
Courts and commentators have used a variety of techniques to
justify a uniform body of federal preclusion law for diversity judgments. Professor Degnan's approach attributed some preclusion
rules to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, using Hanna v.
Plumer 45 as a shield, 4 6 and invoked article III for the rest. 4 7 This
technique will not work. Even the Advisory Committee that drafted
the original Federal Rules, a group not overly concerned about the
Enabling Act's limitations, realized that preclusion rules were offlimits, 48 and in 1946 their successor body corrected a departure
from that view. 49 Rule 18(a) on joinder of claims is anything but a
statement of preclusion policy. 50 This is particularly clear when its
44 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Comparesupra note
31 and accompanying text.
45 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
46 See Degnan, supra note 2, at 763 & n.105.
47 See id. at 763-71; supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
48 See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act, supra note 33, at 1131-37 (1982). For the
Committee's rejection of a proposal that their class action rule specify the effect ofjudgments on persons not parties, see id. at 1164 n.637. See also infra note 53.
49 A 1946 amendment to rule 14 deleted the following sentence: "The third-party
defendant is bound by the adjudication of the third-party plaintiffs liability to the plaintiff, as well as of his own to the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff." 3 J. MOORE,
14.01[1], at 14-7 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcTicE
MOORE]. According to the Advisory Committee, the sentence was "stricken from Rule
14(a), not to change the law, but because the sentence states a rule of substantive law
which is not within the scope of a procedural rule. It is not the purpose of the rules to
state the effect of a judgment." Id. 1 14.01[3], at 14-11.
50 "A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as
many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as he has against an opposing party." FED. R.

1985]

INTERJURISDICTIONAL PRECLUSION

635

permissive language is contrasted with rule 13(a)'s mandatory language on compulsory counterclaims. 5 ' The latter is a product of
history, notably Equity Rule 30, which had been interpreted accurately to predict preclusion consequences for failure to comply. 52
At most, rule 13(a) is a statement of policy suitable as a peg on
which to hang a federal common law rule of preclusion, waiver, or
estoppel, one hopes a rule more flexible than the terms of rule 13(a)
53
suggest.
Another technique used to justify a uniform body of federal
preclusion law for diversity judgments is to ignore post-Erie cases
suggesting that, in diversity cases, federal common law cannot displace state law where differences between the two would materially
affect the character or result of litigation in federal court, leading to
Civ. P. 18(a). See Commercial Box & Lumber Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 623 F.2d 371, 374
n.2 (5th Cir. 1980); Degnan, supra note 2, at 764.
51
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of
serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
52
On Equity Rule 30, see American Mills Co. v. American Sur. Co., 260 U.S. 360
(1922). Under rule 30, "[t]hat which grows out of the subject-matter of the bill must be
set up in the interest of an end of litigation." Id. at 365. Although the original Advisory
Committee refrained from stating a rule of preclusion or, more generally, of effects, in
the text of rule 13(a), it cited American Mills for the conclusion that "[i]f the action proceeds to judgment without the interposition of a counterclaim as required by subdivision (a) of this rule, the counterclaim is barred." 3 MOORE, supra note 49, 13.0112], at
13-8. See also Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974); Southern Constr. Co. v. Pickard, 371 U.S. 57, 60 (1962) (per curiam).
53 The history of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 reveals that Congress did not
mean to authorize court rules having a predictable and direct effect on rights claimed
under the substantive law. See Burbank, supra note 33, at 1121-31. Preclusion rules have
this proscribed effect. Rulel3(a) is valid because it does not purport to state a rule of
preclusive effect. Moreover, even though the rule is animated by a purpose that is dubious under the Enabling Act, its preclusion implications are patent, and it was not
blocked by Congress. Therefore, as long as a putative federal common law rule of preclusion, waiver, or estoppel did not mimic the seemingly inflexible command of the rule,
thereby accomplishing indirectly what could not be accomplished directly, the rule could
serve as a source of policy.
On the use of rule 13(a) to create a waiver or estoppel, see Wright, Estoppel by Rule:
The Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modern Pleading, 38 MINN. L. REV. 423 (1954). The
author of that article observes:
Can a neater example be imagined of the impossibility of sensible distinctions between "substance" and "procedure"? Compulsory counterclaim
provisions are enacted as a regulation of "procedure," and indeed if, as
in most jurisdictions, they have been made by rule of court, they are valid
only as a regulation of "procedure" which must leave rights of "substance" unimpaired. Yet their effects are held to be extra-territorial on
the explicit ground that these effects are "substantive."
Id. at 436.
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forum shopping and inequitable administration of the laws. 54 One

could argue that this "policy of federal jurisdiction" 5 5 is not implicated in the preclusion context because preclusion law does not
have its ultimate bite in the rendering court, but the argument is
purely formal. 56 One is led to believe that the commentators who
have modified Professor Deguan's general rule to the extent of borrowing state preclusion law only when it implicates state substantive
policies must simply disagree with the Erie line of cases and their
57
emphasis on the effects, rather than the purposes, of legal rules.
In my view, unexpressed disagreement with those cases will not
do. 58 I also believe that, if the cases are taken seriously, it is extremely difficult, under a traditional federal common law analysis or
a Rules of Decision Act approach, to justify either across-the-board
uniform federal preclusion rules for diversity judgments adjudicating matters of state substantive law, or the borrowing of state preclusion rules only when they implicate substantive state policies. 59
54 See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 744-46, 752-53 (1980);
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-69 (1965) (dictum).
55 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945). See infra note 59.
56 Under the theory of respect for federal judgments suggested above, see supra text
accompanying notes 20-22, the purpose of the exercise is precisely to determine what
law will furnish the rules of preclusion for a federal judgment. Once those rules are
ascertained, not only will they be binding under the supremacy clause in subsequent
federal or state actions, but they will affect the strategy and conduct of litigation in the
rendering court. As Professor Degnan acknowledged, albeit in a different context, "[ilf
,outcome determinative' is the relevant test .

. .,

hardly anything is more dispositive

than the doctrine of res judicata." Degnan, supra note 2, at 754 (footnote omitted).
57 See sipra note 39.
58 For expressed disagreement, see, e.g., Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REv. 356 (1977); Redish, supra
note 34.
59 The Rules of Decision Act need not be interpreted to remit federal courts to
state law whenever a matter has escaped treatment in federal statutes, in Federal Rules
authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), or in local court rules authorized by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2071 (1982). When it authorized the Court to promulgate Federal Rules, Congress
must have contemplated that it would be necessary for the federal courts to interpret
them and to fill in the interstices of the rules themselves. That does not mean that the
federal courts are free to create common law in areas untouched by the Federal Rules,
or that they may, through federal common law, attribute to the Federal Rules policies
not validly the concern of such rules. It does mean, however, that when the Supreme
Court has exercised the power delegated by Congress to prescribe uniform Federal
Rules, these rules, if valid, should be treated as if they were acts of Congress for purposes of the Rules of Decision Act. A similar analysis may apply to local court rules, at
least if current proposals to discipline the process of their consideration and promulgation are adopted. See H.R. 6344, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1984);Judicial Conference of
the United States, PreliminaryDraft of ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 337, 370-73 (1983); 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan), Release 4, at 1-2
(Oct. 1984).
In determining, however, whether federal sources "require" otherwise than that
state law be applied, the federal courts must consider not only policies grounded in
them that point towards a federal decisional rule, but also those federal policies that
point to the application of state law. The "policy of federal jurisdiction," supra text ac-
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The best hope is to treat the federal courts as a domestic system, in
which case a federal interest in efficient judicial administration, if it
is cognizable after Hanna and Walker,6 0 is at least not contingent and
might be thought by some process to outweigh the policy against
different outcomes on the basis of citizenship. But the full faith and
credit statute does not apply to federal judgments; 6 1 the domestic
model it enshrines does not necessarily entail domestic law, 62 and
the federal courts have not been permitted to act as if they were,
that is, with the autonomy of, state courts in other contexts involving the exercise of diversity jurisdiction. Rather, they have been required to do what the courts of a particular state would do.6 3 Until
64
such time as the Court repudiates or redirects the post-Erie cases
or Congress clearly expresses procedural policies that resonate for
preclusion law in the way rule 13(a) now does, state law should provide the norm on most questions.
Some of the appeal of Professor Degnan's proposed general
rule and, one suspects, part of the stimulus to propose it, lies in the
conviction that state law always governs the interjurisdictional
preclusive effects of a state court judgment. 65 To one reading the
statute for the first time, this conclusion is by no means obvious:
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings . . . shall have the
same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in
the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they
are taken.66

In enacting the statute Congress exercised the power expressly conferred on it by article IV, section 1 of the Constitution to prescribe
the interjurisdictional effects of state judgments. 6 7 This constitutional grant of power does not extend to the preclusive effects of
state judgments in the courts of the same state. Rather, Congress
referred to those effects as the measure of the constitutional (that is,
interjurisdictional) obligation under the statute. The statute simply
does not speak to the source of the law that furnishes the rules in
companying note 55, identified with the exercise of diversity jurisdiction, is one of the
latter.
60
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460 (1965).
61
See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
62
See infra text accompanying notes 65-72.
63
See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
64
See Redish & Phillips, supra note 58.
65
See Degnan, supra note 2, at 750-53. But see id. at 755 n.60. In any event, as a
normative matter, Professor Degnan favored the application of state law. See id. at 773
(quoted supra text accompanying note 11).
66
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
67
See supra note 5.
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the domestic configuration it uses as the referent. Although state
law will usually furnish such rules, federal law may supervene in
some cases as a result of principles governing the relationship between federal and state law having their source elsewhere. Any such
supervening federal law will, by reason of the statute, be binding
nationally, because it is, by reason of the supremacy clause, 6 8 binding domestically.
We have, then, another problem of federal common law.
Where "[1]egal rules . . .[have a significant] impact . . upon the
effectuation of federal rights," 69 as do preclusion rules on federal
substantive rights, there is, under traditional analysis, federal power
to choose the governing law. 70 In most situations, however, uniform federal preclusion rules are not required because the state law
to be borrowed is clear and because uniform rules might prove disruptive to state courts and to litigants. 7' Federal law-in-reserve,
available to check particular state preclusion rules that are hostile to
or inconsistent with federal substantive interests, is sufficient. The
same result obtains under a Rules of Decision Act approach, and in
72
this context, the advantages of that approach are striking.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477 (1979); see supra note 27.
70
Typically, however, the analysis of the problem of federal law in state courts, at
least if the law can be labelled "procedural," has been discrete. Compare, e.g., 16 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§§ 4019-27 (1977) with 19 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, §§ 4514-15. See
also infra note 71.
The Court has made progress in collapsing analytical barriers by citing a case displacing state law in state court as sufficiently analogous to lend support to a discussion
of the borrowing of state law in federal court. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 479 (citing
Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 298 (1949)). For a recent case displacing state law
as to the admission of evidence and jury instructions with uniform federal law, see Nor68
69

folk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980).

71 Commentators have recognized the possibility that "principles akin to federal
preemption may occasionally require state courts to follow federal rules of preclusion."
18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4467, at 625. Apart from a reorientation in thinking about the full faith and credit statute, the approach taken in this Article
suggests that the problem is amenable to federal common law analysis and that displacement may be appropriate more often than previously recognized.

Even before the demise of the tenth amendment as an independent check on federal lawmaking competence, see Garcia v. San Antonio Met. Transit Auth., 105 S.Ct.
1005 (1985), rev' 557 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Tex. 1983), preclusion law, because of its
substantive impact, was an unlikely candidate for solicitude under that rubric. Cf. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (holding that provisions of Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 requiring states to consider
standards and to follow certain procedures in doing so are not unconstitutional invasions of state sovereignty). But cf. id. at 771-75 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting)
(stating that procedural provisions of the Act violate the tenth amendment).
72
Where state court adjudication may preclude federal substantive rights, and
where there is, accordingly, federal lawmaking power as to preclusion rules, would we
say that, when state preclusion rules are employed, they are really federal common law
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If the full faith and credit statute does not choose state law as
the measure of the interjurisdictional effects of state judgments-it
certainly does not speak to the law that governs their effects domestically-the approach taken in recent decisions of the Supreme
Court from Allen v. McCurry73 to Migra v. Warren City School District
Board of Education,74 if not their results, is almost surely wrong. The
Court's approach, requiring that "Congress must 'clearly manifest'
its intent to depart from [section] 1738,''75 would make sense if
Congress had made a choice of state preclusion law in the full faith
and credit statute. 76 It makes no sense if, as I maintain, Congress
made no such choice. 77 Again, state preclusion law rather than uniform federal law will govern in most cases, but the safety net that
Justice Marshall was looking for in Haringv. Prosise,78 in the process
complicating the law of interjurisdictional preclusion (if that is possible), 79 is at hand. State preclusion rules that are hostile to or inor state law borrowed as federal law? I doubt it, but that is the parlance of traditional
federal common law analysis.
We should, however, be quite comfortable with the notion that, under the Rules of
Decision Act, which is binding on the Supreme Court, state preclusion law must yield
when federal substantive policies so require. Perhaps this difficulty, psychological if nothing else, has contributed to the failure to see the problems in their entirety. See supra
note 70. Of course, once one starts down that road, one may begin to question the
traditional two-step federal common law analysis even in its conventional applications.
See supra text accompanying notes 29-30 & 36.
73

449 U.S. 90 (1980).

74 104 S.Ct. 892 (1984). "It is now settled that a federal court must give to a statecourt judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the
law of the State in which the judgment was rendered." Id. at 896.
75 Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 477 (1982).
It has long been established that § 1738 does not allow federal courts to
employ their own rules of res judicata in determining the effect of state
judgments. Rather, it goes beyond the common law and commands a
federal court to accept the rules chosen by the State from which the judgment is taken. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 326 (1839); Mills v. Duryee,
7 Cranch 481, 485 (1813).
Id. at 481-82. The cases cited by the Court neither require the interpretation given them
by the Court nor foreclose the interpretation suggested here.
76 If Congress had made a choice of state preclusion law in the full faith and credit
statute, federal preclusion law might properly be regarded as an exception to the statutory direction, applicable only as a consequence of a subsequent statute containing an
express or implied partial repeal of § 1738.
77 The only relevant choice made by Congress in the full faith and credit statute is
the choice of subsequent proceedings in the courts of the state from which the judgment
issued as a model or referent. In most cases, state preclusion law will furnish the rules in
this context. In some cases, however, federal law will supervene according to the normal principles governing the relationship between federal and state law. When that occurs, there has been no exception to the full faith and credit statute, and thus there is no
need to meet the demanding standards of an express or implied partial repeal.
78 103 S.Ct. 2368 (1983).
79 See id. at 2373 & n.7. The Court's reliance on Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.
147 (1979), is curious. In that case, uniform federal preclusion rules were applied to
determine the effects of a state court adjudication of federal constitutional claims on the
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consistent with federal substantive policies must yield to federal
common law domestically, and the statute makes the domestic solu80
tion binding nationally.
This approach is not a panacea. It does not provide an obvious
answer to a case where a federal statute may be thought to express a
policy in favor of a federal forum, but one not strong enough to
result in a grant of exclusivejurisdiction. In that situation, one must
confront the choice that section 1738 unquestionably makes,
namely, reference to the law that would be applied in a subsequent
action in state court, where a policy in favor of a federal forum is not
pertinent. 81 Nor does it provide such an answer for the exclusive
jurisdiction cases themselves. Whatever one thinks of Judge Pos82
ner's opinion in Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons,
which precluded a federal antitrust claim functionally similar to a
state antitrust claim that could have been joined with other claims in
antecedent state litigation, perhaps he was correct in concluding
that the full faith and credit statute does not play a role.83 The
United States. The Montana Court made no mention of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), the full
faith and credit statute. Justice Marshall, who wrote the Hating opinion, was also the
author of the Court's opinion in Montana.
According to the approach suggested here, it may be that uniform federal preclusion rules should govern in a case similar to Montana but where the second action is
brought in state court, the model provided by § 1738, and thus in a subsequent action in
federal court. Cf. United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984) (nonmutual issue
preclusion does not apply as against the United States). But, if that were true, it would
result from the peculiar status of the United States as a litigant.
80
Apart from situations where federal substantive policy requires, but state law
does not call for, preclusion, see 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4467, at
625-26; supra note 71, concern is most likely to arise in connection with state rules that
are broadly preclusive but relatively inflexible. Indeed, this may have been the Court's
concern in Haring. See Hating, 103 S. Ct. at 2373 n.7. Trans-substantive preclusion rules
can only imperfectly accommodate the array of substantive policies with which they interact, and preclusion rules have a dramatic effect on assertions of substantive right. In
such circumstances, broad judge-made rules of preclusion are tolerable only if they are
sufficiently flexible to adjust to particular circumstances that would make preclusion inappropriate. Trans-systemic, trans-substantive preclusion rules are even more
worrisome.
81
The Court was presented with this problem in Migra v. Warren City School Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984) and Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). The allor-nothing posture in which the question of preclusion was framed doubtless contributed to the Court's approach to § 1738.
82 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir.) (en banc 1984), rev'd, 53 U.S.L.W. 4265 (U.S. Mar. 4,
1985). But see Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 583 F. Supp. 221, 226 n.5 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (questioning Marrese).
83
But whether or not section 1738 allows a federal court to give a state
court's judgment a greater preclusive effect than the state courts themselves would give it

. .

. the statute cannot be used to decide this case.

The Illinois courts, although hospitable to claims ofresjudicata. . . have
not spoken to the. . . issue and will never have occasion to do so, since
no federal antitrust suit can be brought in a state court. The issue
whether such a suit would be barred by res judicata therefore cannot
arise. Section 1738 cannot be used to decide this case.
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problem is not, however, that there can be no state law on the question. Rather, it is that, because of the exclusive jurisdiction of the
in
federal courts, there can be no subsequent state proceeding
84
which the same issue of preclusive effects could arise.
Simplicity and predictability are important goals in the law of
interjurisdictional preclusion. In seeking them, however, we should
not ignore either the complexity of our federal system or the reality
that preclusion rules have effects as well as purposes. Ironically,
symmetry of a sort is attainable, insofar as in both the state-federal
and federal-state configurations, we are left with mixed regimes of
federal and state law.

Marrese, 726 F.2d at 1154.
84 On this view, the Kremer Court should have decided whether title VII vests exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts before addressing the preclusion problem. See
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 479 n.20 (1982).

